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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FIFTH

AMENDMENTDECLARATION OF
PROPERTY AS A HISTORIC LANDMARK UNDER STATE LAW IS NOT A
TAKING WHICH REQUIRES JUST COMPENSATION WHERE THE LANDOWNER IS GUARANTEED A REASONABLE RETURN ON HIS INVESTMENT.

Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York (U.S. 1978)
Pursuant to New York City's Landmarks Preservation Law (Landmarks
Law or the Law), 1 the Landmarks Preservation Commission (Commission)
declared Grand Central Terminal (Terminal) to be a historic landmark. 2 Subsequently, Penn Central Transportation Company (Penn Central), the owner
of the Terminal, agreed to lease the airspace above the Terminal to UGP
Properties, Inc. (UGP) for construction of a multistory office building.3 In
compliance with the requirements of the Landmarks Law, 4 Penn Central
and UGP submitted two construction plans to the Commission for ap-

1. NEW YORK, N.Y. CHARTER & AD. CODE, ch. 8-A, § 205-1.0 (1976). The Law was
passed in 1965 pursuant to a state enabling act, N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAw § 96-a (McKinney 1977).
Under the enabling act, the city is "empowered to provide by regulations, special conditions
and restrictions for the protection, enhancement, perpetuation and use of places, districts, sites,
buildings, structures, works of art, and other objects having a special character or special historical or aesthetic interest or value." Id. Under the Landmarks Law, the Landmarks Preservation
Commission (Commission) is given the responsibility of designating certain buildings as "landmarks." NEW YORK, N.Y. CHARTER & AD. CODE, ch. 8-A, § 207-1.0(n) (1976). A landmark is
defined as
[a]ny improvement, any part of which is thirty years or older, which has a special character or special historical or aesthetic interest or value as part of the development, heritage,
or cultural characteristics of the city, state or nation and which has been designated as a
landmark pursuant to the provisions of this chapter.
Id. Moreover, the Commission may designate certain areas of the city as "historic districts." Id.
§ 207-1.0(h). The Law requires that public hearings be conducted prior to any designation. Id.

§ 207-2.0.
Once a building has been designated as a landmark, its owner is under an affirmative duty
to keep the exterior of the building in "good repair." Id. § 207-10.0(a). In addition, any proposed alteration, demolition or construction to the building must be approved by the Commission. Id. § 207-4.0(a). If an owner proposes structural changes to a designated landmark, he may
apply for a "certificate of no exterior effect," which will be denied if the proposal would alter
the exterior of the building. Id. § 207-5.0. Alternatively, the owner may seek a "certificate of
appropriateness," which will be granted if the proposal would not affect the "protection, enhancement, perpetuation and use" of the historic landmark. Id. § 207-6.0. In determining the
effect of the proposed alterations on the character of the building, the Commission must consider aesthetic, historical and architectural values, architectural style, design, arrangement, texture, material, color, and other relevant factors. Id. § 207-6.0(b)(2). In the event both certificates are denied, the owner may apply for a "certificate of appropriateness based on insufficient
returns," which is available when an owner is unable to receive a reasonable return on his
investment in the property. Id. § 207-8.0.
2. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 98 S. Ct. 2646, 2655 (1978).
3. Id. at 2655. Under the lease, Penn Central was to receive one million dollars annually
during construction of the office building and a minimum of three million dollars in annual
rentals following its completion. Id. This income to Penn Central would have been partially
offset by a loss of between $700,000 and one million dollars due to the displacement of existing
concessionaires by the addition. Id.
4

4. NEW YORK, N.Y. CHARTER & AD. CODE, ch. 8-A, § 207- .0(a) (1976) requires that any

exterior alteration to a landmark be approved by the Commission. See note I supra.

(610)
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proval. 5 Following the Commission's rejection of the proposals, 6 Penn
Central and UGP brought suit, 7 contending, inter alia, that the restrictions
on the development of the Terminal site constituted a "taking" of private
property without just compensation in violation of the fifth amendment to
the United States Constitution. 8 The New York Supreme Court, Trial

Term, granted the plaintiffs' request for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, and barred the city from using the Landmarks Law to prevent

construction of any structure which could otherwise be lawfully constructed
at the Terminal site. 9 On appeal, the New York Supreme Court, Appellate
Division, reversed the judgment of the trial court.10 The New York Court
of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's decision, maintaining that the

5. 98 S. Ct. at 2655. The first plan consisted of a 55-story building to be cantilevered above
the Terminal and to rest on the roof of the Terminal. Id. The second plan was for a 53-story
building and required that portions of the Terminal's facade be torn down. Id. at 2656.
6. Id. at 2656. The Commission, in rejecting the 55-story proposal, stated:
[The Commission] has no fixed rule against making additions to designated buildings-it
all depends on how they are done. . . . But to balance a 55-story office tower above a
flamboyant Beaux-Arts facade seems nothing more than an aesthetic joke ...
.. [W]e must preserve [landmarks] in a meaningful way-with alterations and additions of such character, scale, materials, and mass as will protect, enhance, and perpetuate the original design rather than overwhelm it.
53
Id., quoting Trial Record at 2251. Furthermore, in disallowing the -story addition, the Commission stated that "[t]o protect a landmark, one does not tear it down. To perpetuate its
architectural features, one does not strip them off." 98 S. Ct. at 2656, quoting Trial Record at
2255.
7. 98 S. Ct. at 2646. Penn Central sought a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief to
bar the city, acting through the Commission, from prohibiting the construction of any structure
that might otherwise be lawfully constructed at the Terminal site. Id. at 2657. Moreover, the
plaintiff sought compensation for all periods during which the Terminal, while designated as a
landmark, was subject to the restrictive conditions imposed by the Landmarks Law. Id. For a
discussion of the consequences resulting from the designation of a building as a "landmark"
under the Landmarks Law, see note 1 supra.
8. 98 S. Ct. at 2657. The "taking" provision of the fifth amendment provides: "IN]or shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
The fifth amendment was made applicable to the states by operation of the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment. See Chicago B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897).
In addition to arguing that the application of the Landmarks Law constituted a taking without
just compensation, Penn Central contended that the Commission's action had arbitrarily deprived it of property without due process of law in violation of the fourteenth amendment. 98 S.
Ct. at 2657.
Under the provisions of the Landmarks Law, affected landowners are allowed to seek judicial review of an initial designation, of a denial of a certificate of no effect, and of a denial of a
certificate of appropriateness. Id. at 2653. Penn Central, however, neither sought judicial review of the original designation, nor of the denial of either certificate. Id. at 2655-56.
9. The trial court opinion was not reported. See 98 S. Ct. at 2657. The trial court, while
granting the requested injunctive and declaratory relief, severed the plaintiff's claim for damages for the alleged "temporary taking" of the property. Id.
10. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 50 A.D.2d 265, 377 N.Y.S.2d 20 (1975).
The Appellate Division found that the Landmarks Law was a valid exercise of police power in
that it promoted a legitimate public interest in preserving structures worthy of landmark status.
Id. at 274, 377 N.Y.S.2d at 29. The court determined that while Penn Central may have been
deprived of the most profitable use of the Terminal, such a showing was not sufficient to constitute an unconstitutional deprivation of property. Id. The court noted that Penn Central could
sustain its constitutional claims only if it established that it was deprived "of all reasonable
beneficial use of [its] property." Id. at 272, 377 N.Y.S.2d at 28.
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restrictions on development did not constitute a deprivation of property
without due process of law.' 1 On appeal, the United States Supreme Court
affirmed,12 holding that the application of the Landmarks Law to individual
landmarks did not constitute a taking within the perimeters of the fifth
amendment. Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 98
S. Ct. 2646 (1978).
While the fifth amendment clearly provides that private property shall
not "be taken for public use, without just compensation," 13 the determination of what constitutes a "taking" within the meaning of this provision has
proved to be a considerably difficult problem for the United States Supreme
Court. l4 Although the Supreme Court has acknowledged that the taking
provision was "designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone
to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by
the public as a whole,"' 15 it has nonetheless been unable to develop clear
standards for determining when "fairness and justice" activate the compensatory mechanisms of the fifth amendment. 16 As the Court explained in
Armstrong v. United States, 17 "taking" problems arise because "not every
destruction or injury to property by governmental action has been held to be
a 'taking' in the constitutional sense." 18
Although the determination of what constitutes a taking may largely be
"a question of degree ... [which] cannot be disposed of by general propositions," ' 1 9 various factors helpful in making this determination have been
20
promulgated by the Court. In United States v. Willow River Power Co.,
11. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 42 N.Y.2d 324, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 397
N.Y.S.2d 914 (1977). The New York Court of Appeals framed the issue as whether or not there
was a deprivation of property without due process of law, rather than whether there was a
"taking" within the meaning of the fifth amendment. Id. at 329, 366 N.E.2d at 1274, 397
N.Y.S.2d at 917. This characterization was based on the court's assumption that a "taking" could
only occur where private property is appropriated for public use. Id., citing Fred F. French
Inv. Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 593, 350 N.E.2d 381, 384, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, 8
(1976).
12. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 98 S. Ct. 2646 (1978). The Supreme
Court only addressed Penn Central's fifth amendment taking challenge. Id. at 2658. See note 35
infra.
13. U.S. CONST. amend. V. See note 8 supra.
14. See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155 (1958); United States v. Caltex, Inc., 344 U.S. 149
(1952);
15. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). In Armstrong, a shipbuilder had
contracted to furnish certain boats to the United States. Id. at 41. Upon the default of the
shipbuilder, the government acquired title to all boats and materials pursuant to the terms of
the contract. Id. Consequently, the plaintiff, holder of certain materialman's liens, was barred
from enforcing his encumbrances against the property by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
Id. The Court found that since the value of the liens had been totally destroyed by the government for its own advantage, a taking had occurred which required "just compensation" under
the fifth amendment. Id. at 48.
16. See Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962).
17. 364 U.S. 40 (1960). For a discussion of Armstrong, see note 15 supra.
18. 364 U.S. at 48.
19. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922). In Pennsylvania Coal, the
Court indicated that the determination of whether a taking has occurred will depend upon the
particular facts of each case. Id. at 413.
20. 324 U.S. 499 (1945).
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the Court noted that in order to sustain a claim for compensation, it must be
21
demonstrated that a property right was confiscated by the government.
Specifically, the Willow River Court explained:
The Fifth Amendment, which requires just compensation
where private property is taken for public use, undertakes to redistribute certain economic losses inflicted by public improvements so
that they will fall upon the public rather than wholly upon those
who happen to lie in the path of the project. It does not undertake, however, to socialize all losses, but those only which result
22
from a taking of property.
Furthermore, the Court has concluded that the character of the governmental action is an important consideration in determining whether a
taking has occurred. 23 Where there has been a physical intrusion upon pri25
vately owned property, 2 4 or an appropriation of land by the government,
26
the Court has determined that the landowner is entitled to compensation.
In contrast, where economic interests of private citizens have been seriously

impaired by restrictions imposed on the use of property, as through community zoning plans 27 or through prohibitions on the noxious use of prop-

21. Id. at 502.
22. Id. The question of what constitutes "property" is an important consideration in analyzing a claim for compensation under the fifth amendment. In Willow River, the Court stated that
"not all economic interests are 'property rights'; only those economic advantages are 'rights'
which have the law back of them, and only when they are so recognized may courts compel . . .
compensat[ion] for their invasion." Id. In contrast, less than three months prior to Willow
River, the Court noted in United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945), that
"property" was not to be construed "in its vulgar and untechnical sense of the physical thing
with respect to which the citizen exercises rights recognized by law," but rather should "denote
the group of rights inhering in the citizen's relation to the physical thing, as the right to possess, use and dispose of it." Id. at 377-78.
23. United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917). In Cress, the government had dammed a
river, causing its tributaries to overflow onto the plaintiff's land and depreciating the value of
the land by one-half. Id. at 318. The Court, in requiring compensation, stated that "it is the
character of the invasion, not the amount of the damage resulting from it, so long as the damage
is substantial, that determines the question whether it is a taking." Id. at 328.
24. See, e.g., Causby v. United States, 328 U.S. 256 (1946); United States v. Cress, 243
U.S. 316 (1917). In Causby, the Court determined that takeoffs and landings by United States
military aircraft which interfered with the use of the plaintiff's land for chicken farming constituted a "taking" in that the government had intruded upon a portion of the plaintiff's property
for its own purposes. 328 U.S. at 262 n.7, 264. For a discussion of Cress, see note 23 supra.
25. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
26. See, e.g., cases cited at notes 24 & 25 supra.
27. It is important to note the fundamental characteristics of zoning laws. Generally, since
most zoning regulations are required to conform to a comprehensive plan, similar restrictions
are usually imposed upon parcels of land located within a given geographical area. See, e.g.,
Rodgers v. Village of Tarryton, 302 N.Y. 115, 96 N.E.2d 731 (1951); Eves v. Zoning Bd. of
Adjustment, 401 Pa. 211, 164 A.2d 7 (1960). Property owners are both benefited and burdened
by the limitations. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388-89 (1926). The
objectives of a zoning plan, whether they be the maintenance of property values, the assurance
of orderly development, or a concern for aesthetics, are benefits which inure to all those similarly situated. See id. at 391-93. In other words, an "average reciprocity of advantage" exists
among the landowners under typical zoning restrictions. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,
260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
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erty, the Court has frequently concluded that no taking has occurred. 28
Rather, it has stated that as long as the regulation is a valid exercise of the
police power in that it promotes the health, safety, morals or general welfare
of the community, even a substantial interference with the economic expectations of an individual may not warrant compensation. 29 The Court has
noted, however, that a regulation whose practical effect is the elimination of
almost the entire economic worth of a property right may constitute a taking
within the meaning of the fifth amendment. 30 Moreover, in Goldblatt v.
Town of Hempstead,31 the Court indicated that the extent of economic impact of a governmental regulation upon private property utilized for a
28. See, e.g., Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603 (1927) (ordinance requiring buildings to be set
back from street line upheld); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926)
(ordinance prohibiting the erection of industrial establishments and retail stores in residential
districts found constitutional even though enforcement would result in economic loss to certain
landowners); Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915) (ordinance prohibiting livery
stables in certain areas upheld even though economic hardship would result); Welch v. Swasey,
214 U.S. 91 (1909) (statute prescribing height restrictions of buildings upheld); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (legislation prohibiting use of land for manufacture or sale of alcoholic
beverages upheld in spite of financial loss which would result to certain landowners).
29. See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Welch v.
Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909). In Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894), the Court stated that
before the government may "interpos[e] its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear,
first, that the interests of the public . . . require such interference.'" Id. at 137. Lawton was
cited with approval in Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962). The concept
of public welfare was described by the Supreme Court in Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954),
which involved the plenary power of Congress to legislate with respect to the District of Columbia:
The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. The values it represents are
spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the power of the
legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled. In the present case, the
Congress and its authorized agencies have made determinations that take into account a
wide variety of values. It is not for us to reappraise them.
Id. at 33 (citations omitted).
In examining the validity of zoning ordinances, the Court has indicated that such restrictions must "bear a substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare."
Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928). Applying this concept of public welfare to a
case involving the prohibition of an existing use of land, the Supreme Court determined that a
state had not exceeded "its constitutional powers by deciding upon the destruction of one class
of property [without compensation] in order to save another which, in the judgment of the
legislature, [was] of greater value to the public." Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279 (1928). A
restriction on the use of land which is not reasonably related to a substantial public interest
would not survive constitutional challenges. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590
(1962); Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
30. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). In Pennsylvania Coal, the
plaintiff sold the surface rights to a parcel of land to the defendant, but expressly reserved the
right to mine coal thereunder. Id. at 412. Subsequent to the transaction, a statute was enacted
which prohibited any subterranean mining that threatened the support of the land above. Id.
Consequently, it became commercially impracticable to mine the coal. Id. at 414. While recognizing that the statute furthered important public interests, the Court held that since the impact
of the restriction was the near destruction of the plaintiff's investment expectations, the statute
constituted an unlawful taking. Id. at 414-16. In discussing at what point the imposition of a
land use restriction would rise to the level of requiring compensation in order to sustain the
restriction as a valid exercise of police power, the Court stated: "The greatest weight is given to
the judgment of the legislature, but it always is open to interested parties to contend that the
legislature has gone beyond its constitutional power." Id. at 413.
31. 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
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specific business purpose was a relevant factor in determining whether a
taking had occurred. 32 In summary, while the finding of a taking largely
depends "upon the particular circumstances of each case," 33 the Court has
provided general guidelines for making the determination.
Due to the lack of a federal decision squarely addressing the constitutionality of prohibitions imposed upon selected individual landmarks under a
landmark preservation statute, 34 the United States Supreme Court applied
general principles derived from prior decisions in related areas to resolve the
issues presented in Penn Central.35 Writing for the majority, Justice Bren36
nan addressed and rejected each argument asserted by the appellants.
32. Id. at 594. Specifically, the Goldblatt Court stated:
There is no set formula to determine where regulation ends and taking begins. Although a
comparison of values before and after is relevant, it is by no means conclusive ....
[In]
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, [239 U.S. 394 (1915)] a diminution in value from $800,000 to
$60,000 was upheld. How far regulation may go before it becomes a taking we need not
now decide, for there is no evidence in the present record which even remotely suggests
that prohibition of further mining will reduce the value of the lot in question.
369 U.S. at 594 (citations and footnote omitted). The Supreme Court has therefore held that
although regulations imposed upon private property are important considerations in determining
whether a taking has occurred, they are not stripped of their validity solely because they result
in a great diminution in the value of the investment. See id.; Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S.
394, 408-09 (1915).
33. United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958).
34. The New York state courts, however, have addressed certain constitutional questions
involving the Landmarks Law. In Manhattan Club v. Landmarks Preservation Comm'n, 51
Misc. 2d 556, 273 N.Y.S.2d 848 (1966), the New York Supreme Court, Special Term, held that
the mere designation of a building as a landmark was not confiscatory because the property
owner was free to alter the interior of the building and was guaranteed a reasonable return on
his investment. Id. at 560, 273 N.Y.S.2d at 852. The court also maintained that the "promotion
of the general welfare includes the historical and cultural purpose envisaged by the city law."
Id. The court noted that in order for the ordinance to constitute a taking within the meaning of
the fifth amendment, it must preclude the use of the property for all purposes for which the
property was reasonably adapted. Id., citing Setauket Dev. Corp. v. Romeo, 18 A.D.2d 825,
826, 237 N.Y.S.2d 516, 518 (1963).
In two other cases, the New York courts were confronted with constitutional challenges to the
validity of the Landmarks Law. See Lutheran Church in America v. City of New York, 35
N.Y.2d 121, 316 N.E.2d 305, 359 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1974); Trustees of Sailors' Snug Harbor v. Platt,
29 A.D.2d 376, 288 N.Y.S.2d 314 (1968). However, each case involved the application of the
Law to charitable organizations, in which different considerations prevailed. In Lutheran
Church, the court found that where the Law "would prevent or seriously interfere with the
carrying out of the charitable purpose," it must be held invalid. 35 N.Y.2d at 131, 316 N.E.2d
at 311, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 16.
35. 98 S. Ct. at 2658-66. Justice Brennan framed the questions confronting the Court as
follows:
The issues presented by appellants are (1) whether the restrictions imposed by New York
City's law upon appellants' exploitation of the Terminal site effect a "taking" of appellants'
property for a public use within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment, . . . and, (2) if so,
whether the transferable development rights afforded appellants constitute "just compensation" within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. We need only address the question
whether a "taking" has occurred.
Id. at 2658-59 (citations and footnotes omitted). In regard to the second issue, under New York
City's zoning laws, "owners of real property who have not developed their property to the full
extent permitted by the applicable zoning laws ...[may] transfer development rights to [other]
parcels." Id. at 2654, construing NEW YORK, N.Y., ZONING RESOLUTION §§ 74-79 to 74-793
(1968). See Comment, Development Rights Transfer in New York City, 82 YALE L.J. 338 (1972).
36. 98 S. Ct. at 2662-65. Specifically, the appellants presented the following arguments to
the Court: 1) Penn Central had a valuable property interest in the air space above the Termi-
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Specifically, in response to Penn Central's contention that it was entitled to
compensation for interference with the use of the Terminal's air rights irrespective of the value of the remainder of the property, Justice Brennan noted
that the Court must examine the entire parcel in question, rather than dividing it into "discrete segments," in order to determine whether particular
governmental conduct has "effected a taking." 3 7 The Court focused "both
on the character of the action and on the nature and extent of the interference with the rights in the parcel as a whole," which included the Terminal
38
and its air rights.
Furthermore, the majority noted that the Landmarks Law was similar to
various zoning provisions in that both were related to the promotion of the
public welfare. 3 9 Comparing the two types of restrictions, 40 the Court rejected the argument that diminution in property value alone would constitute a taking. 41 Moreover, unlike the discriminatory character of some land
use schemes, the Court found the Landmarks Law to be a part of a "comprehensive plan." 42 In addition, Justice Brennan suggested that although
the Landmarks Law did burden some landowners more than others,4 3 it was
nevertheless capable "of producing the fair and equitable distribution of
benefits and burdens of governmental action which is characteristic of zoning
laws." 44 Furthermore, the Court recognized that "Ilegislation designed to
promote the general welfare commonly burdens some more than others." 4 5
In response to Penn Central's argument that a landmark preservation law
differs from a zoning regulation in that owners subject to the latter enjoy a
reciprocal benefit from surrounding properties while owners subject to the
former do not,4 6 the Court found that Penn Central did receive a reciprocal
nal, and the restrictions imposed upon this interest by the Landmarks Law, without more,
required compensation; 2) even if the interference with the air space did not in itself constitute
a taking, the operation of the Landmarks Law had so diminished the value of the Terminal as to
warrant compensation; 3) the decision to designate the Terminal a landmark was arbitrary because it was based on individual taste; 4) the Landmarks Law was so inherently different from
zoning ordinances that the same considerations should not control a court's determination as to
whether a taking has occurred; and 5) the Landnmarks Law was an appropriation of a part of
Penn Central's property for a strictly governmental purpose. Id.
37. id. at 2663.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 2663-64.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 2663, citing Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394
(1915).
42. 98 S. Ct. at 2663. The Court rejected Penn Central's argument that the Landmarks Law
was "like discriminatory, or 'reverse spot,' zoning; that is, a land use decision which arbitrarily
singles out a particular parcel for different, less favorable treatment than the neighboring ones."
Id. Rather, the Court found that the Landmarks Law "embodies a comprehensive plan to preserve structures of historic or aesthetic interest wherever they may be found in the city." Id.
(footnote omitted).
43. Id. at 2664.
44. Id. For a discussion of the characteristics of zoning laws, see note 27 supra.
45. 98 S. Ct. at 2664, citing Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Miller
v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926);
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
46. 98 S. Ct. at 2664-65.
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advantage from the operation of the Law. Justice Brennan concluded that
the "preservation of landmarks benefit[ed] all New York citizens and all
structures, both economically and by improving the quality of life in the city
47
as a whole."
Finally, Justice Brennan dismissed the contention that the Landmark
Law was an appropriation of private property by a governmental unit for its
own use. 48 Rather, comparing the Landmark Law to the zoning ordinance
at issue in Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc. ,49 the majority concluded
that the Law protected the aesthetic nature of the area while permitting
Penn Central to utilize the remainder of its property in a profitable man50
ner.
After concluding that the "New York law [was] not rendered invalid by
its failure to provide 'just compensation' whenever a landmark owner [was]
restricted in the exploitation of property interests, such as air rights, to a
greater extent than provided for under applicable zoning laws," 51 the majority determined that the interference with Penn Central's property was not of
such a magnitude as to require the exercise of eminent domain to sustain
it. 52 The Court based this conclusion, in part, upon the fact that the Law
did not interfere with Penn Central's primary use of the property as a railroad terminal, 53 and did not operate as an absolute bar to the use of the air
space above the Terminal. 54 Rather, the Court noted that the Commission's
decision did not foreclose the possibility that the construction of a different
size structure would be permissible under the Law. 55 Finally, Justice
Brennan noted that any loss suffered by Penn Central as a result of the
Commission's action could be offset by transferring the existing air rights to
56
other parcels.
In conclusion, the Court determined that the Commission's actions did
not constitute a taking within the meaning of the fifth amendment because
the restrictions, while promoting the general welfare of the city, also permitted a reasonable return on the owner's investment and did not foreclose the
57
possibility of new construction above the Terminal.
47. Id. at 2665. See text accompanying note 81 infra.
48. 98 S. Ct. at 2665.
49. 427 U.S. 50 (1976). In Young, the City of Detroit adopted a zoning ordinance which
regulated the concentration of adult movie theatres within a specified area. Id. at 52, In sustaining the validity of the ordinance in the wake of numerous constitutional challenges, the Court
noted that "the City's interest in attempting to preserve the quality of urban life is one that
must be accorded high respect." Id. at 71.
50. 98 S. Ct. at 2665.
51. Id.
52. Id. For the resolution of a closely analogous issue in Pennsylvania Coal, see note 30 and
accompanying text supra.
53. 98 S. Ct. at 2665-66.
54. Id. at 2666. The Court recognized that the Commission had merely disapproved the
plans for the two proposed structures. Id. See notes 5 & 6 and accompanying text supra. Penn
Central still had the opportunity to submit plans for the construction of a building which would
be compatible with the character of the Terminal. See 98 S. Ct. at 2666 & n.34.
55. 98 S. Ct. at 2666 & n.34.
56. Id. at 2666. For an explanation of the transferability of air rights, see note 35 supra.
57. 98 S. Ct. at 2666.
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In a dissenting opinion, 58 Justice Rehnquist argued that the Landmarks
Law only superficially resembled a zoning ordinance. 59 The dissent maintained that the Law did not impose the same restrictions on all property
located within a designated area but, rather, singled out certain properties
and treated them differently from adjacent parcels. 60 Moreover, unlike a
valid zoning regulation, where any decrease in value of regulated property is
at least "partially offset by an increase in value which flows from similar
restrictions as to use on neighboring properties," the Landmarks Law did
61
not provide for "an average reciprocity of advantage."
More importantly, the dissent required closer scrutiny of the three
operative components of the taking clause 62 and suggested there were only
two situations where the destruction of property rights by governmental action would not constitute a taking within the meaning of the fifth amendment. 63 Specifically, the dissent acknowledged that prohibitions on certain
uses of land were permissible where either the particular use was injurious
to the health, morals, or safety of the community, 64 or where the restriction
was applied over a broad cross section of the land and each landowner thus
enjoyed a reciprocal benefit along with the burden. 65 According to the dissent, the former exception was inapplicable in the present case because the
Law was not directed toward prohibiting a noxious use of the land.6 6 In
58. Justice Rehnquist wrote a dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Stevens joined.
59. Id. at 2667 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In support of this conclusion, Justice Rehnquist
cited the concession by the New York Court of Appeals to the effect that the restrictions imposed by the Landmarks Law were clearly distinguishable from those imposed by a zoning
ordinance. Id. at 2667 n.2 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), citing Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of
New York, 42 N.Y.2d 324, 329, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 1274, 397 N.Y.S.2d 914, 917 (1977).
60. 98 S. Ct. at 2667 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
61. Id., quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). In distinguishing the Landmarks Law from zoning ordinances, the dissent noted:
Where a relatively few individual buildings, all separated from one another, are singled out and treated differently from surrounding buildings, no ... reciprocity exists.
The cost to the property owner which results from the imposition of restrictions applicable only to his property and not that of his neighbors may be substantial-in this case,
several million dollars-with no comparable reciprocal benefits.
98 S. Ct. at 2667 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See note 27 supra.
62. 98 S. Ct. at 2668 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Specifically, the dissent separated the
taking provision of the fifth amendment into its three essential parts: "property," "taken," and
"just compensation." Id., quoting U.S. CONST. amend. V.
63. 98 S. Ct. at 2669-72 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 2669-70 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), citing Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668-69
(1887).
65. 98 S. Ct. at 2671 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), citing Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,
260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). The dissent explained that while a zoning restriction may reduce
individual property values, there is no taking because the burden is shared evenly among the
property owners, and individual owners are benefited by the restrictions imposed on neighboring properties. 98 S. Ct. at 2671 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In contrast, in the instant case, the
dissent argued that a multimillion dollar burden was being imposed on the property owners
which was "not offset by any benefits flowing from the preservation of some 500 other 'Landmarks' in New York." Id. Such an imposition, the dissent contended, was of the type against
which the fifth amendment was designed to protect. Id.
66. Id. at 2670 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that the "proposed addition to
the . . . Terminal would be in full compliance with zoning, height limitations, and other health
and safety requirements." Id.
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addition, the latter exception was determined to be equally inappropriate
67
because no other adjacent buildings were subject to similar restrictions.
Moreover, the dissent noted that the burdens imposed upon Penn Central,
while not offset by any benefits accruing from other properties designated as
landmarks, 68 included an affirmative duty to keep the landmark in good repair. 69 While recognizing that New York City was in a precarious financial
situation, 70 the dissent maintained that the Court should not ignore the protection guaranteed by the fifth amendment and should not permit the taking
71
of private property without just compensation.
Although Justice Rehnquist properly recognized the two situations
where the destruction of property rights by governmental action would not
constitute a taking within the meaning of the fifth amendment, 72 it is submitted that the dissent incorrectly concluded that neither exception was
applicable to the Landmarks Law.
Under the first exception, the "question is whether the forbidden use is
dangerous to the safety, health, or welfare of others." 73 A statute which thus
furthers the public welfare without prohibiting a dangerous use of land may
not qualify under the noxious use standard, for, as the dissent correctly
stated, "[t]he nuisance exception to the taking guarantee is not coterminous
with the police power itself." 74 An argument can be made, however, that
the alteration of historic landmarks is harmful to the public welfare and thus
qualifies as a "noxious" use of land. 75 The majority's conclusion was not
67. Id. at 2671 (Rehnquist, J.,dissenting). See text accompanying note 60 supra.
68. 98 S. Ct. at 2670 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See note 61 and accompanying text supra.
69. 98 S. Ct. at 2667-68 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In explaining the significance of the
landowner's affirmative duty to maintain the property, the dissent stated:
[T]he landowner is not simply prohibited from using his property for certain purposes,
while allowed to use it for all other purposes. Under the historic landmark preservation
scheme adopted by New York, the property owner is under an affirmative duty to preserve his property as a landmark at his own expense. To suggest that because traditional
zoning results in some limitation of use of the property zoned, the New York landmark
preservation scheme should likewise be upheld, represents the ultimate in treating as
alike things which are different.
Id. (emphasis supplied by the dissent).
70. Id. at 2674 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
71. id.
72. See notes 63-65 and accompanying text supra.
73. 98 S. Ct. at 2670 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
74. Id.
75. Justice Brennan alluded to this argument in his analysis of Penn Central's contention
that several of the cases cited by the majority in support of its conclusions involved governmental prohibitions on the "noxious use" of land, while, in contrast, Penn Central allegedly involved
a restriction on the beneficial use of the property. Id. at 2664 n.30. He stated that the cited
cases were not "noxious use" cases but rather could more easily be understood as involving
restrictions designed to produce a public benefit and applicable to "all similarly situated property." Id. Justice Brennan added that "correlatively, [it could not] be asserted that the destruction or fundamental alteration of a historic landmark is not harmful." Id. This comment may be
interpreted as suggesting a broader view of the "noxious use" exception than the dissent was
willing to allow. In the dissenting opinion, Justice Rehnquist argued that Penn Central did not
present a nuisance or "noxious use" case in that "the proposed addition ... would be in full
compliance with zoning, height limitations, and other health and safety requirements." Id. at
2670 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). In response, Justice Brennan commented that "[tihe suggestion
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grounded upon such a proposition, however, for it relied on the rationale
underlying the second exception to dismiss Penn Central's claim for compensation.

76

In regard to the fifth amendment exception concerning reciprocity of
benefits, 77 the Court successfully analogized the Landmarks Law to zoning
ordinances. 78 The majority determined that the restrictions imposed by the
79
Commission, while not pertaining to any specific section of the city,
nevertheless provided the individual landmark designees with certain benefits.8 0 A legitimate criticism of such a determination may be grounded
upon the huge disparity between the benefits and burdens assigned to Penn
Central. The majority described the benefits accruing to Penn Central as
those set out in the Landmarks Law, namely: fostering civic pride; protecting the city's attraction of tourists; stimulating business and industry;
strengthening the city's economy; and generally enhancing the quality of life
for the city's workers and residents."' If one compares these "benefits" to
the economic burdens imposed on Penn Central, the operation of the Law
would appear to weigh heavily against the Terminal. Not only has Penn
Central lost a minimum of three million dollars in annual rentals from
UGP,8 2 but it is required to preserve the Terminal as a landmark at its own
expense.

83

that the beneficial quality of appellants' proposed construction is established by the fact the
construction would have been consistent with applicable zoning laws ignores the development of
sensibilities and ideals reflected in landmark legislation like New York City's." Id. at 2664 n.30.
Thus, while the majority only passingly commented on a broader interpretation of the "noxious
use" exception, it appears to be a plausible argument. See also note 29 supra.
For a discussion of the harmful effects of a deteriorating environment on urban life, see generally P. BLAKE, GOD'S OWN JUNKYARD (1964); E. HIGBEE, THE SQUEEZE (1960); J.
JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES (1961); I. NAIRN, THE AMERICAN
LANDSCAPE (1965). It is evident that one method of improving the appearance of urban areas
would be to preserve historic landmarks, for one of the real values of any historic building "lies
in its being a delight to the eye." Comment, Legal Methods of Historic Preservation, 19 BUFFALO L. REV. 611, 613 (1970). The need for preservation was most aptly summarized by Robert
Stripe in an address to the Conference on Preservation Law:
Our problem now is to acknowledge that historic conservation is but one aspect of
the much larger problem, basically an environmental one, of enhancing-or perhaps developing for the first time-the quality of life for people. Especially is this so for those
people who in increasing numbers struggle daily to justify an increasingly dismal existence
in a rapidly deteriorating urban environment.
Gilbert, Precedents for the Future, 36 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 311, 312 (1971), quoting address
by Robert Stripe, 1971 Conference on Preservation Law, Washington, D.C. (May 1, 1971)
(unpublished text at 6-7).
76. See notes 39-47 and accompanying text supra.
77. See text accompanying note 65 supra.
78. See notes 39-47 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of the characteristics of
zoning ordinances, see note 27 supra.
79. 98 S. Ct. at 2665. For the pertinent provisions of the Landmarks Law, see note 1 supra.
80. 98 S. Ct. at 2665. See text accompanying notes 46 & 47 supra.
81. 98 S. Ct. at 2652, quoting NEW YORK, N.Y. CHARTER & AD. CODE, ch. 8-A, § 2051.0(b) (1976).
82. See note 3 supra.
83. See note 1 supra; note 69 and accompanying text supra.
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It is through a close examination of the Court's reasoning with respect
to the benefits and burdens attributable to Penn Central, however, that the
decision in the instant case assumes significance. It is submitted that in subjecting Penn Central to a severe financial burden, the Court has indicated
the importance it attaches to the preservation of historic landmarks, and has
recognized that factors other than purely economic considerations may be
considered by courts in reviewing fifth amendment challenges to landmark
preservation laws. 8 4 To extend the rationale underlying the validity of zoning restrictions-an average reciprocity of benefits-to the facts of Penn
Central is to recognize the importance of preserving the nation's historical
8 5
buildings.
It is suggested, however, that the potentially expansive interpretation of
Penn Central must be tempered by the limitations noted by Justice Brennan. Particularly, the majority was clearly influenced by the possible ability
of Penn Central to construct some other type of office building above the
Terminal.8 6 As the majority explained, construction of another building
would, in all probability, be approved if it "harmonize[d] in scale, material,
and character with the Terminal." 8 7 More importantly, the Court noted
that the decision was "based on Penn Central's present ability to use the
Terminal for its intended purposes and in a gainful fashion." '
Although
the Court recognized that the destruction of the economic viability of a parcel of land due to landmark designation would permit relief under the
Landmarks Law, 89 the Penn Central decision does not offer any guidelines
to future courts to determine when, in the absence of such a provision, the
fifth amendment would compel compensation. While responding to the particular situation presented in Penn Central, the majority has thus left the
resolution of these issues for future determination.
In upholding the Commission's action prohibiting the construction of
the proposed office building atop Grand Central Terminal, 90 the Court recognized the validity of land use restrictions based on cultural, educational,
and aesthetic standards with regard to individual landmarks. 91 As the Court

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

See text accompanying note 81 supra.
See note 75 supra.
98 S. Ct. at 2666. See notes 54 & 55 and accompanying text supra.
98 S. Ct. at 2666, quoting Trial Record at 2251.
98 S. Ct. at 2666 n.36. See text accompanying note 53 supra.
98 S. Ct. at 2666 n.36. Specifically, in a footnote, Justice Brennan explained:
We emphasize that our holding today is on the present record which in turn is based
on Penn Central's present ability to use the Terminal for its intended purposes and in a
gainful fashion. The city conceded at oral argument that if appellants can demonstrate at
some point in the future that circumstances have changed such that the Terminal ceases
to be, in the city's counsel's words, "economically viable," appellant may obtain relief
[under the provisions of the Landmarks Law].
Id., quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 42-43. For a discussion of when the Landmarks
Law allows alterations to a structure in order to permit a landowner to receive a reasonable
return on his investment, see note 1 supra.
90. See notes 34-57 and accompanying text supra.
91. See notes 39-47 and accompanying text supra; text accompanying note 81 supra.
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interpreted the New York City Landmarks Preservation Law, 92 no taking has
occurred as long as the landowner is guaranteed a reasonable return on his
investment. It must be recognized, however, that the Court's sweeping prohibition may be limited by the particular factual setting in which Penn Cen93
tral arose.

John J. Ford
92. See notes 53-55 and accompanying text supra; note 89 supra.
93. See notes 86-89 and accompanying text supra.
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